Suppose that a transmitter Alice potentially wishes to communicate with a receiver Bob over an adversarially jammed binary channel. An active adversary James eavesdrops on their communication over a binary symmetric channel (BSC(q)), and may maliciously flip (up to) a certain fraction p of their transmitted bits based on his observation. We consider a setting where the communication must be simultaneously covert as well as reliable, i.e., James should be unable to accurately distinguish whether or not Alice is communicating, while Bob should be able to correctly recover Alice's message with high probability regardless of the adversarial jamming strategy. We show that, unlike the setting with passive adversaries, reliable covert communication against active adversaries requires Alice and Bob to have a shared key (of length at least Ω(log n)) even when Bob has a better channel than James. We present inner and outer bounds on the informationtheoretically optimal throughputs as a function of the channel parameters, the desired level of covertness, and the amount of shared key available. Further, these bounds match for a wide range of parameters of interest.
I. INTRODUCTION
The security of our communication schemes is of significant concern -Big Brother is often watching! While much attention has focused on schemes that aim to hide the content of communication, in many scenarios, whether or not communication has taken place should also be kept secret. This observation has drawn attention to the problem of covert communication. In a canonical information-theoretic setting for this problem, a transmitter Alice may wish to transmit messages to a receiver Bob over a noisy channel, and remains silent otherwise. James eavesdrops on her transmission through another noisy channel. The communication goals are twofold. Firstly, the communication should be covert, i.e., James should be unable to accurately distinguish whether or not Alice is transmitting. Simultaneously, it should also be reliable, i.e. Bob should be able to correctly estimate Alice's transmission with high probability (w.h.p.). Recent work [2] - [5] has successfully characterized the information-theoretic limits on the amount of covert communication possible from Alice to Bob. Specifically, it turns out that only O( √ n) bits may be covertly transmitted from Alice to Bob over n channel uses, and this sublinear throughput (as opposed to the linear throughput in most communication settings) results from the stringent requirement on Alice's transmissions imposed by the need to remain covert -she must "whisper", so to speak.
Prior information-theoretic work on covert communication largely focuses on random noise to both Bob and James. While such channel models are appropriate for passive eavesdroppers, a truly malicious adversary might wish to also actively disrupt any potential communication even when it is (Ω(log(n)), O( √ n))), we show an achievable coding scheme as well as an outer bound on the information-theoretically optimal throughput.
While the achievability schemes alluded to in the paragraphs above have high computational complexity for Alice and Bob, when ∆(n) ∈ Θ( √ n log(n)) we demonstrate a communication scheme that has poly(n) computational complexity, makes no computational or causality assumptions on James, and achieves within a constant factor of the informationtheoretically optimal throughput possible.
Related work and comparisons
1) Random noise vs adversarial noise channels (a) Non-covert setting: Unlike the well-studied random noise channels, a tight capacity characterization for general adversarial channels (also called Arbitrarily Varying Channels (AVCs)) is still elusive. One way to classify adversarial models is via the adversary's knowledge level of the transmitted codeword X. Models of interest include the classical/omniscient adversarial model [8] - [10] (full knowledge of X), the myopic adversarial model [11] (noisy observation of X), the oblivious adversarial model [12] - [14] (no knowledge of X), and the causal adversarial model [6] , [7] (causal observation of X). In particular, the work [11] studies reliable communication over ADVC(p|q) (as defined earlier), and shows that if the adversary is sufficiently myopic (i.e., the noise q on the BSC(q) to James is strictly larger than the fraction p of bit flips he can impose on the channel to Bob), the capacity (without any shared key) exactly equals that of a BSC(p). (b) Covert setting: Though the model of interests is still ADVC(p|q), the adversary considered in this work is essentially insufficiently myopic due to the stringent constraints on Alice's X imposed by covertness. Indeed, as shown in Theorem 1, no reliable and covert communication is possible if ∆(n) < 1 2 log(n), and this impossibility result is motivated by the symmetrizability condition for AVCs. Secondly, Theorem 2 shows that even if Alice and Bob have enough shared key and p < q, the optimal covert throughput of ADVC(p|q) is in general less than that of random noise channels (which is in contrast to the non-covert setting wherein the capacities of ADVC(p|q) and BSC(p) are the same). This is because the stringent input constraints allow James to induce a strictly noisier channel (from Alice to Bob) than a BSC(p), based on his noisy observation of X.
Note that the adversarial model considered in [15] is similar to this work, but they differ significantly in terms of both the channel assumptions and the input constraints.
2) List decoding and shared key: One of the primitives our achievability schemes rely heavily on is that of list decoding [16] , [17] , which guarantees that, even in the presence of omniscient adversaries, Bob is able to localize Alice's message to a small (often constant-sized) list at a communication rate approaching that of a corresponding random noise channel. However, the "usual" list decoding model does not translate to our setting, since an omniscient adversary who can flip pn bits could easily flip all the bits of X (of Hamming weight O( √ n)) and thus Bob's list-size must be large (in order to contain the true codeword X). Hence in our work we prove a novel version of list decoding for such input-constrained channels, in which we rely heavily on James' myopicity. Given the guarantees on the list-size (no more than n 2 in this work), Bob is able to use the key shared with Alice to disambiguate this list down to a unique message (see [18] for AVCs). The rest of the paper is orgnized as follows. We introduce the system model in greater detail in Section II. The main results and the high-level intuition of the proofs are presented in Section III. We defer the detailed proofs to the full version [1] .
II. MODEL
Random variables and their realizations are denoted by uppercase and lowercase letters respectively, e.g., X and x. Vectors are denoted by boldface letters, e.g., X and x. The ith elements of X and x are denoted by X i and x i respectively. Encoder: Let n denote the blocklength (number of channel uses) of Alice's communication. Alice's encoder Ψ(., ., .) takes three inputs (i) The single bit transmission status T : Alice's silence is denoted by T = 0 whereas T = 1 denotes that she is active. (ii) The message M , which is either 0 (if Alice is silent), or uniformly distributed over {1, 2, . . . , N } (if Alice is active). (iii) The ∆(n)-bit shared key K distributed uniformly over {0, 1} ∆(n) . Prior to transmission, only Alice knows the transmission status T and message M , and both Alice and Bob know the key K -James is a priori ignorant of all three.
If Alice is silent (T = 0), then Alice's encoder Ψ(0, ., .) must output X = 0, a length-n vector comprising entirely of zeros. On the other hand if Alice is active (T = 1), then Alice's encoder Ψ(1, ., .) may output an arbitrary length-n binary vector X. The collection of all outputs of Alice's encoder Ψ(1, ., .) is called the codebook, and the code C comprises of Alice's encoder, the codebook, and Bob's decoder (described below). The code is known to all parties (Alice, Bob, and James). The relative throughput 2 is defined as r log(N )/ √ n. James' observation: James receives the vector Z = X ⊕S, whereS i is a Bernoulli(q) random variable. Hence James' observation Z is the output of a BSC(q) to which the input is Alice's transmission X. On the basis of Z and his knowledge of the code C, James, as described below: (i) estimates Alice's transmission status T , and (ii) generates a jamming vector S to disrupt communication.
estimates Alice's transmission status T asT = Φ(Z). We use a hypothesis-testing metric to measure covertness:
Definition 1 (Covertness). Let α(Φ) = PrS(T = 1|T = 0) and β(Φ) = Pr M,K,S (T = 0|T = 1) respectively be the probability of false alarm and the probability of missed detection of an estimator Φ. The communication is said to be
For the optimal estimator Φ * ,
is the variational distance between the two distributions (corresponding to T = 0 and T = 1, respectively) on James' observation Z [19] . (ii) Jamming function: As a function of his observation Z and his knowledge of the code C, James chooses a jamming function to output a length-n binary jamming vector S of Hamming weight at most pn. In general James' jamming function corresponds to a conditional probability distribution p S|Z,C that stochastically maps James' observation and the code C to his jamming vector S. Note that p S|Z,C is an nletter distribution over length-n binary sequences S. Decoder: Bob receives the length-n binary vector Y = X ⊕ S, and then applies his decoding function Γ(.,
. . , N } to produce his message reconstructionM from his observation Y and the key K. Probability of decoding error: Bob's probability of error is defined as 4 P e (Ψ, Γ) max
Remark 1. Note that the probability as defined in (1) is maximized over the n-letter distribution p S|Z,C . This is to indicate that there may (or may not) be a stochastic component to the jamming function James uses to generate S from his observation Z. Hence we include an averaging over S.
Achievable relative throughput/Robust covert capacity: For any p, q ∈ [0, 1/2), ∆(n) ≥ 0, and d ∈ (0, 1), a relative throughput r ∆(n), d (p, q) is said to be achievable if there exists an infinite sequence of codes C n with ∆(n) bits of shared key such that each of the codes in the sequence has relative throughput at least r ∆(n), d (p, q), lim n→∞ P e (Ψ n , Γ n ) = 0, and ensures the communication is (1 − d )-covert. Then the robust covert capacity r * ∆(n), d (p, q) is defined as the supremum over all possible achievable relative throughputs.
III. MAIN RESULTS
We now summarize the main contributions of this work, and defer the detailed proofs to the full version [1] due to the page limitation. There are at least two types of estimators and jamming functions James can use, each of which results in a non-trivial restriction on the reliable and covert throughput obtainable from Alice to Bob. Perhaps surprisingly, there is a unified achievability scheme that Alice and Bob can use that 3 Note that even if James ignores the knowledge of Z, a naïve estimatorΦ (which always outputs T = 0 or T = 1) can also guarantee α(Φ) + β(Φ) = 1. Therefore, the definition for covert communication implies that James' optimal estimator Φ * cannot be much better than the naïve estimatorΦ. 4 Two types of decoding error are considered in (1) -when Alice is silent, and when she is active. Also note that the Pe defined in (1) is the average probability of error (averaged over both the message and the shared key). A stronger metric (that is not studied in this work) is the maximum probability of error, which would require that for each message the corresponding probability of error is small. meets these constraints for a wide range of parameters of interest, and thereby shows that these types of estimators/jamming functions are in some sense optimal from James' perspective.
• Weight-detector: This estimator (with computational complexity O(n)) merely computes the Hamming weight of Z, and if this is significantly higher than expected (qn + c t √ n for some constant c t ), then James estimatesT = 1. 5 • Hypothesis-testing estimator (optimal): James first computes two distributions p 0 (Z) and p 1 (Z), which respectively correspond to the distributions of Z when T = 0 and T = 1. The optimal estimator Φ * outputsT = 1 if p 1 (z) ≥ p 0 (z), and outputsT = 0 if p 0 (z) > p 1 (z). Note that this estimator potentially has computational complexity exp(n) for James.
• Oblivious jamming: This jamming strategy ignores James' channel observation Z, and chooses S as a sum of multiple (at most O( √ n)) potentially valid transmissions from Alice. Since Bob's received vector Y is a sum of Alice's transmission X and James' jamming vector S, this jamming strategy attempts to confuse Bob as to what Alice truly transmitted. Note that this jamming strategy can be implemented by James causally, with computational complexity at most O( √ n) times the computational complexity of Alice's encoder.
• Myopic jamming: In this jamming strategy, even if Alice's transmission is covert and hence James is unsure whether or not Alice is active, James nonetheless uses his observation Z to guess which channel uses correspond to potential 1's in Alice's transmitted codeword if she indeed is active. He then preferentially flips these bits -specifically, if Z i = 1 then he flips the corresponding X i w.p. about p/q, but if Z i = 0 he doesn't flip X i -hence James concentrates his bit-flip power in bits to be likelier to correspond to the actual transmissions from Alice. Note that this jamming strategy can be implemented by James causally, with computational complexity linear in n. This converse is presented in Theorem 2.
For any channel parameters p, q ∈ [0, 1/2), and any covertness parameter d ∈ (0, 1), the following definitions help characterize inner and outer bounds on the throughputs. Definition 2 (Weight normalized mutual information and code-weight parameter). The weight normalized mutual information for Bob and James are respectively defined as
The code-weight design parameter is given as t(q, d )
The parameter t(q, d ), corresponding to the average Hamming weight of our codewords, is independent of the blocklength n. Roughly speaking, "most" codewords have Hamming weight about t(q, d ) √ n. Following the techniques in [3] , [4] , [20] , it has been optimized to be as large as possible while still ensuring (1 − d ) covertness. The quantity I J (q) (times the normalization t(q, d ) √ n) denotes the mutual informa-tion corresponding to the BSC(q) from Alice to James. The quantity I B (p, q) (times the normalization t(q, d ) √ n) denotes the mutual information of the worst i.i.d. channel inducible from Alice to Bob due to an i.i.d. myopic jamming strategy employed by James. While mutual information from Alice to Bob in the presence of such an i.i.d. jamming strategy clearly serves as an outer bound on Alice's achievable throughput, it is perhaps more surprising that this is also achievable by our codes in a wide range of parameter regimes.
A. Impossibility results for ∆(n) < 1 2 log(n) When the amount of shared key is less than 1 2 log(n), if James employs a weight-detector with an appropriate threshold, combined with an oblivious jamming strategy, it turns out that he can ensure that the probability of decoding error is bounded away from zero for any non-trivial covert codebook. Roughly speaking, since Alice's codebook comprises mostly of low-weight codewords, James is able to confuse Bob by choosing a jamming vector that comprises of the sum of multiple potential codewords -"spoofs" -Bob is unable to disambiguate Alice's true X from among the cacophony of spoofs. In the following, let Φ ρ be the weight-detector with threshold ρ, and p (ob) S|Z,C be the oblivious jamming strategy. Theorem 1. Let d ∈ (0, 1) and ∆(n) < 1 2 log(n). For every sequence of codes C n of blocklength n, relative throughput r, and encoding complexity f C (n), there exists an n 0 such that for every n > n 0 , at least one of the following is true: 1) (C n is not covert) There exists a detector Φ (e.g., the weightdetector Φ ρ for an appropriately set threshold ρ) with computational complexity Θ(n) such that α(Φ) + β(Φ) < 1 − d .
2) (C n is not reliable) There exists a constant η = η( d , p, q) and causal jamming strategy p S|Z,C (e.g., the oblivious jamming strategy p 
The converse result in Theorem 1 holds even if Alice and Bob try to covertly transmit o( √ n) bits of message, in which case the relative throughput r equals zero while the throughput (over n channel uses) is positive.
B. An upper bound on the robust covert capacity for any ∆(n)
Next, we obtain an upper bound on the robust covert capacity that holds regardless of the amount of shared key available. We bound the throughput of any simultaneously covert and reliable code by first calculating the maximum average Hamming weight of codewords from such a code, and then deriving an upper bound on the number of distinct messages possible. In order to get a bound on the average weight of the codewords, we analyze the detection probabilities with respect to the weight-detector Φ ρ with a threshold ρ that depends on the codebook. To bound the number of codewords, we analyze Bob's reliability with respect to the mutual information t(q, d )I B (p, q) √ n of the channel induced under James' myopic jamming strategy p (my) S|Z,C . 6 The lower bound on the probability of error in (2) is valid for all values of ∆(n). However, it is non-vanishing only if ∆(n) < 1 2 log(n). √ n and 0.03 √ n respectively. The achievable positive throughput regions for each corresponding ∆(n) are now above the respective black curves. (4) Regardless of the value of shared key ∆(n), no robust covert communication is possible below the blue dashed line corresponding to p = q. This is in contrast to "classical" covert communication [3] in the presence of a passive adversary, wherein increasing amounts of shared key allow for covert communication even when p > q, i.e., the channel from Alice to Bob has more bit-flips than the channel from Alice to James. This is due to the fact that when p > q, among the classes of channels James can induce from Alice to Bob there is one which has zero channel capacity. Theorem 2. Let d ∈ (0, 1). For every sequence ∆(n), 1) r * ∆(n), d (p, q) = 0 if 0 < q ≤ p < 1/2 (the region below the blue dashed line in Fig. 2 
if 0 < p < q < 1/2 (the region above the blue dashed line in Fig. 2) .
Further, when 0 < p < q < 1/2 (resp. 0 < q ≤ p < 1/2), if C n is a sequence of codes with relative throughput r > t(q, d )I B (p, q) (resp. r > 0), then there exists an n 0 and > 0 such that for every n > n 0 , at least one of the following is true: 1) (C n is not covert) There exists a detector Φ (e.g., the weightdetector Φ ρ for an appropriately set threshold ρ) with computational complexity Θ(n) such that α(Φ) + β(Φ) < 1 − d .
2) (C n is not reliable) There exists a causal jamming strategy p S|Z,C (e.g., the myopic jamming strategy p The upper bound r * ∆(n), d (p, q) ≤ t(q, d )I B (p, q) (when 0 < p < q < 1/2) is strictly smaller than the upper bound for the "classical" covert communication model [5] wherein the channel from Alice to Bob is a BSC(p).
C. Inner bounds for ∆(n) ≥ 6 log(n)
We now present inner bounds based on low-weight random codes and the novel myopic list decoding lemma (first developed in [11] ). This lemma first demonstrates that for the parameter regime under consideration, (w.h.p.) from James' perspective there are multiple (roughly O(exp( √ n))) equally plausible codewords transmitted by Alice -hence James has a large "uncertainty set". It then shows that, averaged over the uncertainty set, regardless of James' specific choice of jamming vector S, very few codewords X in James' uncertainty set are "killed" by S (i.e., if Bob attempts to listdecode the corresponding Y = X ⊕ S, his list-size is larger 
Shared key size
Achi. positive throughput regions (Small) ∆(n) ∈ (Ω(log(n)), o( √ n)) p < q and IB(p, q) > IJ (q) (Moderate) ∆(n) = σ √ n for σ > 0 p < q and IB(p, q) + σ > IJ (q) (Large) ∆(n) ∈ ω( √ n) p < q than some polynomial -say n 2 ). 7 Hence, w.h.p. over the randomness in which X in the uncertainty set is instantiated, James is unable to force too large a list on Bob. To complete the argument we show that the dominant error-event (among all joint distributions James can induced between Z and S) corresponds to James behaving in the i.i.d. manner specific in the myopic jamming strategy. Bob is then able to use the O(log(n))-sized shared key to disambiguate the list down to a unique element via a hashing scheme. For any d ∈ (0, 1) and ∆(n) ≥ 6 log(n), we define the achievable positive throughput region R + ∆(n), d as a collection of values (p, q) where our codes have positive throughput. Theorem 3. Let d ∈ (0, 1) and ∆(n) ≥ 6 log(n). For three different regimes of ∆(n), the achievable positive throughput regions R + ∆(n), d are summarized in Table I . For any d ∈ (0, 1), ∆(n), and (p, q) ∈ R + ∆(n), d , the maximum achievable relative throughput r ∆(n), d (p, q) = t(q, d )I B (p, q) = r * ∆(n), d (p, q). Note that the maximum achievable relative throughput r ∆(n), d (p, q) meets the outer bound (in Theorem 2) on robust covert capacity r * ∆(n), d (p, q). For any 0 < p < q < 1/2, to achieve relative throughput t(q, d )I B (p, q), the minimum size of the shared key is
The intuition behind this scaling of ∆(n) is as follows -when the BSC(q) from Alice to James is worse (has lower mutual information) than the worst channel he can instantiate from Alice to Bob, then O(log(n)) bits of common randomness suffice for our scheme to work. Conversely, if James can make the channel from Alice to Bob to be worse than the channel to him, then Alice and Bob need a larger shared key (equaling at least the mutual information difference between the two channels) to cause James' uncertainty set to be large enough for the myopic list decoding lemma to hold. Structurally this phenomenon in the presence of an active adversary James is intriguingly reminiscent of the phenomenon observed in [3] , which shows that covert communication in the presence of a passive adversary is possible if and only if the key-rate exceeds the normalized mutual information difference between the eavesdropped channel and the main channel. Fig. 2 graphically represents the numerics of Theorems 2 and 3. It is clear that, in general, the achievability and the converse may not match when ∆(n) ∈ (Ω(log(n)), o( √ n)) or ∆(n) = σ √ n (for some small σ > 0). D. Computationally efficient codes with ∆(n) ∈ Ω( √ n log n) We also develop a computationally efficient encoding and decoding scheme when the amount of shared key is Ω( √ n log(n)). This scheme works via the permutation-based coding -Alice permutes her codeword (of Hamming weight 7 In the non-covert myopic adversarial model [11] , a codeword X is "killed" by S if X is no longer the closest codeword to the corresponding Y = X⊕S. t(q, d ) √ n) uniformly at random among all length-n binary sequences of Hamming weight t(q, d ) √ n using the shared key. As argued in [3] , such a source-resolvability scheme results in covertness against James. Also, as argued in [18] , [21] such codes also work well to scramble James' bit-flips, and make his actions behave in an i.i.d. manner.
Let C BAC (p, q) be the capacity of the Binary Asymmetric Channel (BAC) with Pr(Y = 1|X = 0) = p and Pr(Y = 0|X = 1) = (1 − q)p/q, and Bernoulli(ρ * ) be the input distribution that achieves the capacity. Theorem 4. Let p, q ∈ [0, 1/2), d , ∈ (0, 1), and r < t(q, d ) ρ * C BAC (p, q). There exists a sequence of codes C n of blocklength n, relative throughput r, and n 0 such that for every n ≥ n 0 , 1) C n is (1 − d )-covert.
2) C n ensures the probability of error P e (Ψ n , Γ n ) ≤ .
3) The encoding and decoding complexity is poly(n).
